The following is an article by Daniel Brett, Chairman of the British Ahwazi Friendship Society (BAFS), which was published by the Henry Jackson Society . The HJS is a non-partisan British think-tank promoting democratic geopolitics. The HJS has the backing of some of the country's leading politicians - including Nobel Peace Prize Winner David Trimble and former foreign office minister Denis McShane - as well as Colonel Tim Collins (Commander, First Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, Iraq 2003), Jamie Shea (Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, NATO) and Gerard Baker (Assistant Editor, The Times).
The life of the Ahwazi Arabs has become perceptibly worse in recent months, particularly following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in June 2005. The recent militarisation of their province of Khuzestan is bound up with Iran's desire to extend its economic and political influence into Basra and other Arab Shi'ite provinces in Iraq. Ahmadinejad was placed in power with the help of the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force that forms part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards - the quasi-military organisation that operates parallel to the armed forces, but professes its loyalty to the religious elite. The Revolutionary Guards have taken an active role in ethnic cleansing in Khuzestan and have assumed responsibility for border security along the Shatt Al-Arab.
The ethnic cleansing of the Arabs is no longer simply a matter of controlling their homeland's vast natural resources. The Revolutionary Guards and the Council of Guardians see Khuzestan as a launch pad for advancing Iran's sphere of influence in the Middle East. Key to this project is the 'Arvand Free Zone', a 155 square km military-industrial zone that stretches from Minoo Island south of Abadan, along the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, to Iran's land border with Basra. As part of this project, all Arabs living within the zone that surrounds the cities of Khorammshahr (Mohammarah) and Abadan will be expelled from their homes and farms. In addition, the ancient date palm groves on Minoo Island that have sustained Arab livelihoods for centuries will be cut down, creating an ecological disaster zone. At certain points along the Shatt Al-Arab, the zone is literally within a stone's throw of Basra, particularly at Khorammshahr (Mohammarah). The port city was the scene of some of the most intense fighting during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). It is regarded as one of the Middle East's most strategic points.
The narrowness of the Shatt Al-Arab enabled Iran and Iraq to stage large-scale amphibious assaults during the war. In February 1986, 30,000 Iranian troops crossed the Shatt Al-Arab in a surprise attack to invade and occupy Iraq's Al-Faw peninsula and create a bridgehead for further advances into Iraq. The new attempt to militarise the river and the creation of the military-industrial 'Arvand Free Zone' will give Iran the capacity to carry out similar attacks in the future.
The Zone will complete and consolidate an ongoing process of land confiscation and militarisation along the Khuzestan-Basra border. Over recent years, the Iranian regime has confiscated large tracts of land from local Arabs and transferred ownership to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and state-owned enterprises. For example, around 47,000 hectares of Ahwazi Arab farmland in the Jofir area, near the Ahwazi city of Abadan, has been transferred to members of the security forces and government enterprises. Further, more than 6,000 hectares of Ahwazi farmland north of Shush (Susa) has been taken to 'resettle' the faithful non-indigenous Persians, according to directives by the Ministry of Agricultures and the Revolutionary Corp Command.
In all, up to 500,000 Ahwazi Arabs could be displaced by the creation of a 5,000 km2 security zone along the Shatt Al-Arab. The zone's industrial enterprises focus on creating strong economic links between Khuzestan and Basra, representing an opportunity to bring Basra's authorities and businesses under Iranian influence and draw them away from Baghdad's control.
The zone's security element will strengthen covert operations inside Iraq, with the objectives of securing an early exit of Coalition troops, influencing Iraq's political system and using patronage to control local authorities in Basra. The zone could also be used to train, fund and organise militias loyal to Tehran.
Among the most well-known Iranian-backed groups is the Badr Corps, the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) which had a strong presence in Khuzestan before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Another is the Lebanese Hezbollah, which has long enjoyed Iranian patronage. Both the Badr Corps and the Hezbollah have been implicated in human rights abuses against Ahwazi Arabs.
Documents leaked from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Fajr Garrison in Khuzestan, which serves as the organisation's main headquarters for southern Iran, show that Tehran is employing up to 40,000 agents in Iraq. The information was revealed in March 2005 by former Iranian agents who defected due to pay cuts. It showed that Fajr Garrison hosts the IRGC's Qods Force, which runs the vast underground network in Iraq. Agents are paid by middle-men, who carry out regular visits to Ahwaz City to obtain payments and be debriefed by Qods commanders. The regime's activities in Khuzestan are linked to the rise of militias in Basra and the British government's discovery that weapons used by insurgents were likely to have originated from the IRGC, via the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah.
It is no coincidence that attacks on British troops and a sudden upsurge in militia activity in Basra province have occurred at the same time discussions are being held on the issue of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and its potential use in the construction of nuclear warheads.
The international response to the overwhelming evidence of ethnic cleansing, militarism and state terrorism in Khuzestan has been weak. Reports from UNCHR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been ignored by legislators, who have placed emphasis on 'normalising' relations with Iran. The European Parliament's 'Friends of a Free Iran Group', which campaigns for a democratic Iran, had to lobby hard to get a condemnation of the forced displacement of Arabs in a consensus resolution on Iran, which was passed by the EP in October. Addressing the European Parliament, Commissioner Jan Figel, speaking on behalf of Benita Ferrero-Waldner (European Commissioner for External Relations), underlined the 'excessive use of force to suppress unrest in the provinces of Khuzestan and Kurdistan' as a matter of 'deep concern.' In the case of the Ahwazi people, it is the bureaucrats of the European Union and the United Nations who are leading the case for economic and political justice, not the politicians.
The greatest level of support for the Ahwazis has come from continental politicians such as Portuguese Socialist MEP Paulo Casaca, while every appeal to British MPs has been met with indifference. Contrary to claims by Tehran, there is currently no British interest in the Ahwazi issue, let alone a desire to support democratic movements in Khuzestan. It is astonishing that despite an ongoing campaign of ethnic cleansing, which is also intrinsically related to Iran's desire to control instruments of terror in Basra, not one British MP has raised the issue in Parliament. Yet, the Ahwazi issue is crucial for building a democratic Iran and a stable Middle East.
See also: Democracy, Ethnicity and Repression in Iran: The Plight of the Ahwazi Arabs , by Daniel Brett, published by the Henry Jackson Society
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